Category Archives: Uncategorized

Anuncio / Announcement / Announce / Ankündigung

Source: Anuncio / Announcement / Announce / Ankündigung

Un ciclo finaliza y otro comienza. Es con sentimientos encontrados que comparto la noticia de que por cuestiones personales y organizacionales he decidido dejar de ser editor de las redes sociales de la Asociación Mexicana de Historia Económica (AMHE), función que ocupé desde marzo de 2007. / A cycle ends, another cycle begins. It is with a heavy heart that I share the news that for personal and organizational reasons I have decided to resign the position as editor of the social networks of the Mexican Economic History Association (AMHE), which I held since March 2007. / Un cycle se termine, un autre cycle recommence. C’est avec des sentiments troublants que je partage les nouvelles que pour des raisons personnelles et d’organisation, j’ai décidé de démissionner du poste de rédacteur des réseaux sociaux de l’Association Mexicaine d’Histoire Économique (AMHE), une poste que je tenais depuis Mars 2007. / Ein Zyklus endet und eine andere beginnt. Es ist mit gemischten Gefühlen, die ich teilen die Nachricht, dass ich beschlossen habe, Social-Media-Editor der Mexikanischen Vereinigung der Wirtschaftsgeschichte (AMHE) zu aufhören, meine Arbeitsstelle seit März 2007, wegen der persönliche und organisatorischen Faktoren.

8,106 posts después / 8,106 posts later

Es con sentimientos encontrados que comparto la noticia de que este será el último post de El Blog de la AMHE, que inició transmisiones en agosto de 2009 . Del mismo modo, por cuestiones personales y organizacionales he decidido dejar de ser editor de las redes sociales de la Asociación Mexicana de Historia Económica. / It is with a heavy heart that I share the news that this will be the last post of El Blog de la AMHE, which began broadcasting contents in August 2009. At the same time, for personal and organizational reasons I have decided to quit my position as editor of the social networks of the Mexican Economic History Association (AMHE).

Source: 8,106 posts después / 8,106 posts later

Boldizzoni again

Gracias por el reblog, Sebas!

economichistorybar

Hola, aprovecho a repostear un comentario de Manuel Bautista sobre un paper de Boldizzoni. Como se comentó por acá el libro de él, subo este comentario para fomentar el debate!

http://nephist.wordpress.com/2013/11/16/the-otherness-of-the-past-economic-history-and-policy-in-the-age-of-disenchantment/

 

abrazo grande, 

seba 

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“Empire State of Mind”: The Land Value of Manhattan, 1950-2013

IT’S BOTH CURVES IN THE REAL ESTATE MARKET DIAGRAM, STUPID: HISTORY, SUPPLY- AND DEMAND-SIDE HOUSING POLICIES IN MANHATTAN. MY BLOG POST FOR NEP-HIS THIS WEEK. In an island worth $825 billion dollars, a mixture of technical expertise and political willingness to act both in favor of people’s right to a decent home on the demand-side and against created interests on the supply-side are rather necessary to solve the urgent housing problems of New York City, which have only aggravated since the beginning of the Great Recession.

“Empire State of Mind”: The Land Value of Manhattan, 1950-2013

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Learning Statistics Through Dance

Learning Statistics Through Dance

Four short films demonstrating statistical concepts through dance. The concepts are: correlation, variance, frequency distributions, sampling and standard error. Project title: ‘Communicating Psychology to the Public through Dance’ (AKA ‘Dancing Statistics’) 

“As in the modern world.” Foreign and Domestic Equities in the London Stock Exchange, 1869-1928

Comment on foreign and domestic equities in the London Stock Exchange, 1869-1928 for NEP-HIS

The NEP-HIS Blog

Interior of the London Exchange, The Illustrated London News, March 25, 1854. Interior of the London Exchange, The Illustrated London News, March 25, 1854.

Bloody Foreigners! Overseas Equity on the London Stock Exchange, 1869-1928.

by Richard S. Grossman, Wesleyan University (rgrossman@wesleyan.edu)
Abstract: This paper presents data on quantity, capital gains, dividend, and total returns for domestic and overseas equities listed on the London Stock Exchange during 1869-1928. Indices are presented for Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, North America, Australia/New Zealand and for the finance, transportation, raw materials, and utilities sectors in each region. Returns and volatility were typically highest in emerging regions and the raw materials sector. Dividend yields were similar across regions and differences in total returns were due largely to disparities in capital gains. Returns of firms in more industrial markets were relatively highly correlated with each other and with developing regions with which they had substantial colonial or trade connections. Contingent liability was most extensively employed where leverage…

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“The Otherness of the Past:” (Economic) History and Policy in the Age of Disenchantment

My take on a stimulating paper by Francesco Boldizzoni.

The NEP-HIS Blog

On history and policy: Time in the age of neoliberalism
Francesco Boldizzoni (francesco.boldizzoni@unito.it), University of Turin
URL: http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/zbwmpifgd/136.htm
Abstract: It is often said that history matters, but these words are often little more than a hollow statement. In the aftermath of the Great Recession, the view that the economy is a mechanical toy that can be fixed using a few simple tools has continued to be held by economists and policy makers and echoed by the media. The paper addresses the origins of this unfortunate belief, inherent to neoliberalism, and what can be done to bring time back into public discourse.

“How will the 2008/09 crisis influence historical scholarship? […] The recent crisis reminds us that the policy response is as much a matter of ideology and politics as it is a matter of economics. […] The widespread use of the Great…

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Schumpeter: The global Mexican | The Economist

Mexico is unusual in that it not only has a globalised elite but also a globalised peasantry. The rich study in the United States; the poor mop floors there. Both groups benefit their homeland. The elite pick up skills and contacts at American universities, which help Mexican firms do business with their giant neighbour. Migrant mop-wielders send money home to poor Mexican villages. The scale of border-straddling is colossal. One Mexican in ten lives in the United States—some 12m people. Add in the descendants of Mexicans born in the United States and the number is 33m. This creates a market for Mexican products: Corona is the most popular imported beer north of the border.

via Schumpeter: The global Mexican | The Economist.

The “top” in Kindleberger and Schivelbusch

I find it important to distinguish between the financial crisis per se and the way it affects the real (i. e. productive) economy. Most financial crises result from an excess in indebtedness, and  the most common way through which a financial panic becomes an economic downturn is through a reduction in credit and the need to reduce leveraged positions in the balance sheets of firms, households and governments.  In my view, these stylized facts (developed at length in Kindleberger’s Manias, Panics and Crises) have been lost in our discussions on the origins of the Great Depression.

Kindleberger’s “Introduction” to The World in Depression, 1929-1939 is useful to understand the debates on the causes of the Great Depression within economic historiography during the 1980s. Whereas the Monetarist school blamed the (in)action of monetary authorities as the primary cause of the problem, the Keynesians saw the drop in consumption as the main originator of the economic crisis.

Kindleberger suggests that the Great Depression should be understood within the context of business cycles under capitalism. Scholars should take into account the systemic complexity of the economy, both in its micro and macroeconomic scales, considering equally important the failures of “automatic forces in the economy” and the “decision-making machinery” (Kindleberger 1986, 6) that magnified existing economic problems. Kindleberger stresses the need to incorporate two further developments of economic theory, the first being a general equilibrium analysis of the world economy, the second, a study of the interests and strategies of historical actors through game theory.
Kindleberger does not diminish the importance of the (failed) intellectual consensus constraining economic policies in the 1920s and 1930s: he further reasserts it when mentioning that public attitudes favoring the gold standard and a balanced government budget were very strong at the time. In his view, power always meets finance in the international economic and monetary system, which is always in need of “a country that is prepared, consciously or unconsciously, under some system of rules that it has internalized, to set standards of conduct for other countries” (Kindleberger 1986, 11). In the interwar period, the Bank of England was no longer the ultimate monetary authority overseeing the operation of the gold standard, London faced increased competition from New York as financial capital of the world, the sterling pound began its decline as the favorite reserve currency of nations everywhere. These factors might help us reflect on how transitional this age was for the governance of the global political economy.
While Kindleberger adequately summarizes the factors constraining the way policymakers in all countries reacted against the economic catastrophe, Schivelbusch situates the focus on the attitudes of the public and politicians in the US and Europe on the policies enacted by the Roosevelt administration and the not-so-obvious parallels it had with the Nazi and Fascist programs. In the first chapter, “Kinship” of his Three New Deals, Schivelbusch superbly revisits the attitudes and mindsets from both sides of the Atlantic with newspapers and other periodical publications of the era.
Schivelbusch demonstrates how both Italian Fascists and German National Socialists seized the opportunity to compare the New Deal to their own economic policies. The New Deal was seen at the time as another corporatist experiment, a valid alternative to both capitalism and socialism. Both the New Deal and Fascism “were seen as a form of postliberal style of government whose main thrust was toard social planning and a state-directed economy” (Schivelbusch 2006, 30). The author asserts that officials from Germany, Italy and the US all kept looking on what the others did, thus showing that international policy bandwagoning is more common under critical conjunctures. Not only were policies adapted and adopted, but the efforts for economic recovery all were presented with the discourse of war mobilization.
Both Schivelbusch and Kindleberger raise the methodological warning of not dismissing high political circles both in the domestic and the international spheres: to forget the “top” actors in our narratives is to deliberately ignore that they were usually situated in a privileged position to convey messages to a larger public. We should not forget that economic ideas and policies set at the top permeate social strata if we are to write a bottom-up history of the period.